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Utah Code Annotated, Section 57-1-19, et seq. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-37-1 
Rule 24, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 
Rule 43, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 
Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 2.9, Rules of Practice in the District Courts of the 
State of Utah 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was instituted by Respondents (Sacos) on 
February 7, 1986 in the Fifth Circuit Court to recover damages 
incurred by reason of a default on a note. R.36-40. The case was 
removed to the Third District Court. R.5, 6, 12-15. Sacos made a 
Motion for Summary Judgment which the Court ordered to be 
determined by written briefs and not oral argument. R.68-71, 81, 
95, 96. Petitioners (Goodwins) submitted a brief in opposition to 
Sacos1 motion. R.82-87. Sacos1 motion was supported by Affidavits 
of Rob Haertel and Anna Iron, Defendant's amended responses to 
Plaintiffs1 Interrogatories and Request for Admissions, and a 
memorandum in support of the motion. R.70-75, 88-93. 
Based upon the briefs, memorandum, affidavits and answers 
to interrogatories in the file, the Court made a minute entry 
notifying the parties that the motion was granted. R.94. Sacos1 
counsel prepared the Judgment which was entered on August 21, 1987. 
R.101-104. An appeal was taken by Goodwin from the Judgment. 
R.105-106. 
On March 14, 1989, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial 
court's decision. The Petitioners then brought a Petition for 
2 
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Court on April ' ,  I tun I Ins Petition for Wri-: or Certiorar. *as 
filed on June 6# 198 9, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1, On or about the LOth day of May, 1978, Iris B. Searle 
and Goodwins entered into a Real Estate Contract for the sa 31 e of 
p r o p e r t y 11 :" imriiii i, I "i," m l 1 y UH i i h I " l| I < I ' ' i I " 88 
(See a l s o E x h i b i t "A A-I. ol' t h e Appendix., J 
2 , tin or about t h e 13 th day of Augus t , 19?^ a Note .Hind 
T I l i s t D e o r l w t - ' i l t 1 s t l l i s ! i h i i II i«m ]|| f n i i II || i I i i II i II l i II II i i II I II II i w i n 1 || i i -11 
to Goodwins. Pursuant to t.ht' Note, inodhiins promised tn pa,» I he 
sun of $ 1, 926 , 7 7 to Sacos II, i, jet her w i th attorney ' s fees expended 
f ' r'oll lleof" i o n o f ! hit- illolhil' il ,« In n i II (UIIOOPSS 'MM P r u i ssn i r , N ::)te 
was s e c u r e d by a "I l u s t Deed in f a v o r of Sacos on t h e Summit County 
p r o p e r t y II-1 I I, ' 4 , Hi " J9 , 92# y j . (oee a l s o E x h i b i t 
11
 i \ "I -Ill I mi mi II ' "I r II Hi i ii|i»(i)ond i >; , ) 
3 , Af te r t h e d a t e of d e l i v e r y of t h e Note and T r u s t Deed 
d e s c r i b e d a b o v e , I r i s EL S e a r l e d i e d , Hoi i n t e r e s t i n s a i d Note 
and "irirusll' IDoi ,11 v,\ Il a i m e d lllliiy ll'ioii e t i t i i l i I 
4 ri>o I e n d a n t s / G o o d w i n s f a i l e d t o pay p r o p e r t y t a x e s due 
on t h e s e c u r e d p r o p e r t y and s a i d p r o p e r t y was s o l d and "onveyed by 
t a x dleei II I  11 Nnriti I«I I Ho I be i "| 11 i HI I II ill mi I I In I Ii i a ^ ::: f 
J u n e , 1985, R ,9 r 11, i ' ( 01 , H «! , HO( 92 , n j , (See a l s o Exh i bi t 
"A", A-6 of t h e Append ix , ) 
5 in I i Il i l l II II Il III i II i i f I n - * I'11 mi II II | II I hi | I I I i I 
remained due, owing and in default under the Promissory Note the 
3 
sum of $4279.52 together with interest from May 1, 1985, late 
charges, interest and costs in accordance with the terms of the 
Note. Sacos brought an action in the Fifth Circuit Court, Salt 
Lake County, Murray Department, praying for judgment in the amount 
set forth above, together with costs and attorney's fees, in 
accordance with the terms of the Note. R.9, 28, 38, 70, 71, 89. 
6. On or about the 28th day of August, 1986, Sacos moved 
for removal of the case to the Third District Court and for leave 
to amend the Complaint to name the Estate of Iris B. Searle as a 
plaintiff. An Order granting the Motion was entered on September 
26, 1986. R.5, 6, 12-15. 
7. On the 7th day of October, 1986, plaintiffs 
submitted their Request for Admissions and First Set of Interroga-
tories to defendants. Plaintiffs made a motion to compel answers 
to those Admissions and Interrogatories when defendants failed to 
respond adequately. The Court granted the Motion to Compel and 
ordered defendants to pay $100.00 to the plaintiffs for the 
obtaining of the Order. R.46, 55-65, 72-75. 
8. Following completion of discovery on or about the 
11th day of June, 1987, Sacos moved for summary judgment against 
Goodwins, and Goodwins requested a continuance of the hearing on 
the Motion or, in the alternative, that the Court order the parties 
to submit briefs and determine if oral argument was necessary. 
R.68, 69, 78-80. 
9. On the 21st day of July, 1987, the Honorable Michael 
R. Murphy entered an Order providing that the Court would consider 
4 
^.jie briefs, memoranda, affidavits, p] ead ings and answers t o 
interrogatories and reqi les t for admissi oris which had been t i I ed. 
Judge 1 In in : j: hy decided t: :: i: = ii< ier a iecision on Sacos * Motion for 
Summary Judgment w:i thout oral argument , R.8] , 95-95. 
10. Briefs, memoranda ai u I affidavits were submitted and 
considered with the pleadin js answers t: :: • i nterrogatories and 
r e q u e s t " I" 1 n 1 • „i« ill :i ss i c >ns, R 70 75 82-87, 88-93 
1 1 . I i 1 a d e c i s i o n d a t e d J iil/y 2 3 , 1987, t h e Cour t g r a n t e d 
P l a i n t i f f s Motion for Summary Judgment nun t h e ground t h a t S a c o s 1 
c a wi 111111 mil premised iipnn m r H n t 1 vi I n 1 11 i ren I nsmrn in I iiiinii 
and , c o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e "One Act Lon Rule" was n o t p e r t i n u i t ll'Iie 
C o u r t a l s o c o n c l u d e d t h a t Goodwins hail not s u b m i t t e d any m a t e r i a l 
c o g n i z a b l e u n d n r Riillli rnfi n f tin-1 111 • i II 1 Riiiiilun, w\ c i v i l Pnnnmi i i i 1 n n|h u h 
.would render, t h e Summary Judgment u i a p p r o p i l a t e , 111 in Couit no ted 
t h a t d e f e n d a n t , George Raymonil Goodwin, i s an a t t o r n e y in t h e S t a t e 
o f (V i l f i r n Hi 1 II Ii 111 mi nut 1' mm! 1 ," 1 im I unit , I hi I  11 II II 1 HJ 1 in | I u I Pnn i i i l 
Defendants1 opposition is so deficient and 
impertinent that the court would sua 
sponte invoke Rule U.R.C.P., if 
plaintiffs had expended any fee in a rep] y 
memorandum. 
A ropy ul line d e c i s i o n i s a t t a c h e d h e r e t o a s E x h i b i t Ill" (" I tie 
Addendum, M", "LM . 
12 Summary .Judcpm nt; in a r c o r d a n c e w i th t h e d e c i s i o n 
o f t: : he Z 11 I r 1 1 n 1 n j y i j s l „„'" II Il "inn awarding pidin1..i i i s 
$ 4 , 2 7 9 . 5 2 , t o g e t n e r w i t h i n t e r e s t a t t h e r a t e of n i n e p e r c e n t (9%) 
p e r annum from t h e 1st" day of May, III'"iiii'-i 1 in t h e sum of ?8 77 .Q5, 
$68 ] () ii 1 1 ::: ::) 5 t s 11 Il nil, t o rney LJ I  :i , » 111111 t h e sum oil % I,, jun; IJO 
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pursuant to the Affidavit of Bryan W. Cannon. The entire Judgment 
was to bear interest at the rate of (12%) per annum.. R. 101-106. 
13. Goodwins made no objection to the form of the 
Judgment nor to the attorney's fees included in said Judgment. 
Respondents dispute the Petitioners' Statement of Facts 
in the following respects: 
a. This case is not an attempt to collect a 
deficiency judgment since "deficiency judgments" only apply 
to trust deeds and notes where a foreclosure has been 
initiated and completed. No foreclosure of a trust deed 
occurred in this case. 
b. The record does not support Goodwins contention 
that he did not actually receive notice from the County that 
a tax sale was scheduled on the property nor is there evidence 
that Goodwins ever attempted to actually pay back taxes by 
tendering $3,894.82. 
c. There is no evidence before the Court to 
support Petitioners1 statement that the property was resold 
by the tax purchaser for an amount in excess of $12,000.00 nor 
is there any evidence which established the fair market value 
of the property on the date of the tax sale. 
d. The record does not support Goodwins' 
allegation that Sacos was notified of the tax sale in July of 
1985. 
e. The Petitioners' statement of facts does not 




THE PETITIONERS HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED AN 
ADEQUATE REVIEW OF THE CASE. 
At the District Court, Goodwins had their opportunity of 
opposing summary judgment with memoranda. Upon review of that 
memoranda, Judge Murphy determined that the opposition to summary 
judgment was "deficient and impertinent" and that Defendants had 
"not submitted any material cognizable under Rule 56 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure" so as to render the Summary Judgment 
inappropriate. (See Exhibit "B" of the Appendix.) Summary 
Judgment was entered. 
The Court of Appeals determined after review of the 
issues and Briefs under Rule 31 that the case qualified for an 
expedited decision. On March 14, 1989, the same day as oral 
arguments were made, Judges Bench, Davidson and Jackson affirmed 
the trial court judgment and further ordered that Goodwins pay 
costs and attorneyfs fees of Respondents for the appeal. 
It should be noted that through the appeal stage of the 
proceedings, George Raymond Goodwin, one of the Defendants, acted 
as the attorney for Petitioners. On March 29, 1989, a Petition for 
Rehearing was filed by new counsel for Goodwins. That Petition for 
Rehearing set forth the same basic arguments and questions as are 
now raised on the Petition of Writ of Certiorari. Goodwins have 
therefore had three (3) separate opportunities for the review of 
7 
the very arguments now presented in their Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. Their arguments have been considered and ruled upon 
by competent courts of jurisdiction. 
Under Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, 
review by a Writ of Certiorari is not a matter of right, but of 
judicial discretion and will be granted only when there are special 
and important reasons therefore. Petitioners have cited 
subsections 2 and 3 as the controlling reasons but have failed to 
show how they apply. The panel of the Court of Appeals did not 
decide the decisions of law in conflict with any questions of the 
Supreme Court. The ruling of the Appellant Court is in fact 
consistent with the decisions of this Court. (See arguments set 
forth hereinafter) . The decision of the Court of Appeals has also 
not departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings or sanctions so as to call for an exercise of this 
Court's power of supervision. In fact, the course recommended by 
Petitioners would recognize just such a radical departure from the 
purpose of the statutes of the State of Utah (See arguments set 
forth hereinafter). 
II. 
THE "ONE ACTION RULE" DOES NOT BAR RESPONDENTS 
RECOVERY OF AMOUNTS DUE UNDER A NOTE. 
The "One-Action-Rule" does not apply to this case because 
the property which was secured by the Note in question had already 
been lost as security through a tax sale. R.9, 11, 37, 38, 83, 89, 
92, 93. 
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A. Since the property secured by the Trust 
Deed had been sold for delinquent property 
taxes, the fruitless procedure of foreclosure 
on non-existing security was not necessary. 
This Court had made it abundantly clear that the "One 
Action Rule" as established by Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-37-
1, does not apply to circumstances where the security has been lost 
or is valueless. Cache Valley Baking, Co. vs. Logan Lodge No. 
1453, 618 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1980) and Lockhart Co. vs. Eguitable 
Realty, Inc., 657 P.2d 1333 (Utah 1983). 
In the case of Utah Mortgage and Loan Company vs. Black, 
618 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1980) the Utah Supreme Court has stated in 
speaking of the "One Action Rule" as follows: 
When the security has been lost or disposed of 
without any fault or blameworthy conduct on the 
part of the creditor.. .an action may be brought 
on the note without going through a fruitless 
procedure of foreclosure on nonexistent 
security. 
In the case now before the Court, the Trial Court 
appropriately noted that Sacos1 claims are not premised upon or 
related to a foreclosure action. R.94. Such action would have been 
fruitless since Goodwins had already lost the property due to their 
failure to pay property taxes for five (5) years. Goodwins 
recognized too late that it was their failure to pay taxes that had 
caused the loss of the real estate. (See Appellants1 Brief at page 
2.) 
9 
B. Whether or not a Trust Deed securing property 
has a named Trustee is not relevant to any 
examination of the applicability of the "One 
Action Rule11. 
The Petition alleges that Sacos1 failure to name a 
Trustee in the Trust Deed contributed to the loss of the security. 
Such argument is logically barren. Utah Law does not require a 
trustee of a trust deed to watch over the status of title to 
property nor to make assurances that property taxes get paid. The 
duty to pay taxes and protect the security rests solely on the 
shoulders of the trustor (Goodwin). 
On appeal, Goodwins tried to argue that a trustee of a 
Trust Deed should be held to the same standards as a trustee in 
Title 75 (Uniform Probate Code) under Chapter 7 (Trust 
Administration under the Probate Code). However, there is nothing 
in Chapter 7 of Title 75 that requires that the conditions for the 
operation of a trust instrument cross reference to the creating of 
a trust deed under the separate and distinct Title 57 of the Utah 
Code. The duties of the trustee under Title 57 are clearly laid 
out. Those duties only apply to the foreclosure or reconveyance 
of trust deeds. 
The establishment of a trustee on a trust deed is merely 
a procedural devise designed to provide for the non-judicial 
foreclosure of, or in the alternative, a reconveyance of a trust 
deed. (See Utah Code Annotated, Section 57-1-19, et seq.. copies 
of which statutes are attached hereto in Appendix "C".) 
10 
There is no duty set forth in Title 57 which requires a 
Trustee or lien holder to pay delinquent taxes on behalf of an 
owner. Even if Sacos had known that Goodwins had failed to pay 
property taxes, Sacos and a Trustee could choose to allow the tax 
sale to occur. It appears quite persumptuous for Goodwins to try 
to shift their neglect to Sacos. Goodwins1 behavior caused the 
loss of the security. No act of neglect by the lien holder caused 
the tax sale since there is no duty under law or opportunity by the 
lien holder to pay those delinquent taxes on behalf of Goodwins. 
Although it would have been senseless after the 
commencement of this action for Sacos to appoint a trustee for the 
purpose of conducting a foreclosure since the security no longer 
was available for foreclosure, no damages in this respect were even 
alleged in the Defendants1 Answer. R.27, 28. Also, no allegation 
was made before the District Court which would equate any failure 
by Sacos as a basis for avoidance of judgment for the amounts which 
Goodwins had agreed to pay. In other words, no causal connection 
issue was ever raised in the pleadings by Peitioners regarding the 
language of the Trust Deed and the occurrence of the tax sale. The 
"appointment of trustee" issue should be ignored since it was not 
raised in the pleadings (See Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure). 
III. 
THERE IS NO MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT WHICH WOULD 
PRECLUDE THE AWARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
RENDERED BY THE DISTRICT COURT. 
Petitioners have failed to raise any material issue of 
11 
fact which would preclude the award for Summary Judgment issued by 
the District Court, 
A. Goodwins' Petition fails to disclose any 
material fact which is in question. 
All of the following facts were established by 
uncontroverted pleadings, responses to interrogatories and requests 
for admissions or affidavits. A Note and Trust Deed was given by 
Goodwins to Sacos. The Security was lost pursuant to a sale by the 
State of Utah for delinquent taxes. Goodwins had failed to pay 
those taxes. Goodwins are delinquent under the terms of the 
Promissory Note in the amount of $4,279.52, together with interest 
from May 1, 1985. Goodwins have failed to remedy the delinquent 
balance. R.7, 8, 11, 27, 28, 36-38, 40, 70-75, 82, 83, 88, 89, 92, 
93. 
B, Sacos had no duty which could have been 
breached. 
The Petition of Goodwins is based and reliant upon two 
(2) duties which Goodwins claim exist under the law. If these 
duties do not exist, the Petition fails because no relevant factual 
issue remains unresolved. First, Petitioners1 claim that a 
Trustee, appointed on a trust deed has duties beyond the 
reconveyance or foreclosure sale of the property. But there is no 
statute which sets forth that duty. Also, none of the cases cited 
by Petitioners support that position. In McHuah vs. Church, 583 
P.2d 210 (Alaska 1978), the Alaska Court imposed a duty upon a 
Trustee to perform impartially durincr the process of a foreclosure 
sale. The test applied by that Court was whether or not there was 
12 
evidence from a foreclosure that the sale has been conducted with 
fraud or unfairness. 
In Koegel v. Prudential Mut. Sav. Bank, 752 P.2d 385 
(Wash. App. 1988) a foreclosure sale was again being disputed. 
The high standard and fiduciary duty described in this case was 
only applied to the duty of conducting a foreclosure sale. 
This Court has taken the same position. The case of 
Blodaett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978) was a case brought 
by former owners of land against Trustees under a Trust Deed to 
recover for alleged fraud arising out of the public foreclosure 
sale of the property. This court indicated that there was a duty 
of care during the foreclosure proceeding. 
It is interesting to note that these cases were not cited 
by Goodwins until after their appeal was denied. They are now 
calling for a new basis for overturning the Judgment. 
Respondents acknowledge that a Trustee does have an 
important duty and fiduciary obligation to both the trustor and 
beneficiary during a foreclosure proceeding. However, Petitioners 
are now attempting to expand and extend that duty to uncharted 
regions. To support Goodwins in their argument could mean the end 
of trust deeds in the State of Utah. It would become difficult for 
lenders to find trustees willing to monitor property values and 
delinquent tax obligations on all properties on which they are 
named as trustee. The fees of a trustee would become prohibitive. 
Title companies, banks and attorneys would refuse to act as 
trustees if they are required to step up and cure defaults of 
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trustors. Yet that action has been suggested as a requirement at 
page 8 of Petitioners1 Petition. The use of trust deeds would 
cease since the cost and ability to operate thereunder would be too 
burdensome, risky and expensive. That could make the lending 
community look to other states for their investments. 
Goodwins also attribute some significance to the 
irrelevant issue of negligence of Sacos. However, this argument 
pre-supposes that there is a duty upon Sacos when learning of a tax 
sale to pay those delinquent taxes. The amount due on the Note was 
$4,279.52. The tax liability was $3,894.82. Petitioners arguments 
ignore an important right. Sacos can make a business decision not 
to raise and pay out a substantial sum to save the* security on a 
note. The note balance even approximated the amount of the tax 
obligation. The only neglegence which is relevant is the 
negligence of Goodwins for failing to pay property taxes. 
IV. 
PETITIONERS1 PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED BY 
REASON OF THEIR FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE RULES 
OF APPEAL. 
George Raymond Goodwin, an attorney, failed to follow the 
following rules of appeal: 
1. The original Brief for appeal was not submitted 
within the time set by the Court; 
2. The original Brief was totally deficient in several 
respects. In a letter dated May 22, 1988, Susan E. Richards, 
Deputy Clerk, directed Mr. Goodwin to correct five (5) items on the 
Brief; 
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3. Only one copy of Goodwins1 Brief was sent to 
Respondent in breach of Rule 26 of the Utah Supreme Court; 
4. Goodwins1 Brief failed to include a brief statement 
of the Jurisdiction of the Court and the Nature of the Proceedings 
Below and Goodwins failed to make citations to the District Court 
Record, both as required by Rule 24 of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court. Said failures justify the denial of the Petition. 
(See Gregory v. Fourthwest Investment Ltd. , 735 P.2d 33 (Utah 
1987); C.M.C. Cassitv, Inc. v. Aird. 707 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1985); 
Brooks v. Department of Employment Security, 736 P.2d 241 (Utah 
App. 1987); Koolaus v. Standard Oil Co. of California. 746 P.2d 
1182 (Utah App. 1987) and Demetropolus v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960 
(Utah App. 1988).) 
V. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES WERE APPROPRIATELY AWARDED 
PURSUANT TO THE TERMS OF THE NOTE AND UNDER 
GOODWINS1 VIOLATION OF RULE 11 OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
The Note, which is the subject of this legal action, 
provides as follows: 
. If action be instituted on this Note, I promise 
to pay such sum as the Court may fix as 
attorney•s fees. 
The Trust Deed also includes the following similar provisions: 
Trustor agrees to pay all taxes and assessments 
on the above property, to pay all charges...to 
pay all costs and expenses of collection 
(including Trustee• s and attorney' s fees in the 
event of default in the payment of the 
indebtedness secured hereby...). 
(See Exhibit "A", A-4, 5 of the Appendix.) 
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The cases cited by Petitioners in their brief support 
Sacos1 position that attorney's fees should be awarded. In Cabrera 
v. Cottrell. 694 P.2d 623 (Utah 1985), the Court indicated that a 
prevailing party is entitled to an award of attorney's fees if that 
party was entitled to the fees at trial and asked for them. The 
party is not entitled to the fees only if they did not ask for them 
at trial. In our case an Affidavit of Bryan W. Cannon was 
submitted as a request for an award of attorney's fees. That 
affidavit remains uncontroverted. The affidavit refers to the Note 
as the basis of the request. 
The Order also includes a provision for the requested 
attorney's fees. R.101-104. Goodwins made no objection to the form 
of the Order although Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in the 
District Courts of Utah permitted an objection. Respondents 
maintain that no objection was made because of the obvious 
reasonableness of the fees requested. 
In Jenkins v. Bailey, 676 P.2d 391 (Utah 1984) , the court 
indicated that attorney's fees are to be awarded if they are agreed 
to in a contract or provided for by statute. This is the clear and 
unmistakable position of the law in Utah. Biesincrer v. Behunin, 
584 P.2d 801 (1978) and Trainer v. Cushina. 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 
1978). Goodwins allege that U.C.A., Section 78-37-9 applies to 
this case for the procedure of determining attorney's fees. But 
that section only applies to "cases of foreclosure". 
Goodwins agreed in the Note and Trust Deed to pay 
attorney's fees incurred in the event of legal action. R.73, 74. 
16 
(See also Exhibit "A", A-4, 5, of the Appendix.) On this basis 
alone, the judgment for attorney's fees is supported. 
Under earlier law the Supreme Court concluded that 
attorney's fees may be awarded where litigation was spiteful, 
contemptuous or obstructive and not resorted to in good faith. 
Western Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Marchant, 615, P.2d 423 (1980). Now, 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
. . . the Court, upon motion or upon its own 
initiative, shall impose upon the person who 
signed it (pleasing, motion or other paper), 
a represented party, or both, an appropriate 
sanction, which may include an order to pay to 
the other party or parties an amount of the 
reasonable expenses incurred because of the 
filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
Judge Murphy in this case used his discretion in determining that 
a Rule 11 award of attorney's fees was justified. R.94. 
VI. 
U.CA. SECTIONS 57-1-32 AND 57-1-34 
DO NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE. 
Sections 57-1-32 and 57-1-34 have been inappropriately 
referenced in Petitioners' Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Sacos' 
did not take action for a deficiency judgment. Said Sections only 
apply to a lawsuit initiated after the non-judicial sale of trust 
property by a trustee. No such sale occurred, therefore, these 
Sections simply do not apply. Also, the case of Cox v. Greens, 696 
P.2d 1207 (Utah 1985) does not apply for the same reason. 
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VII. 
ADDITIONAL ATTORNEYS FEES SHOULD BE AWARDED 
TO RESPONDENTS FOR PREPARATION OF THIS BRIEF. 
The same basis which supports the District Courts award 
of attorney's fees pursuant to the Note and Rule 11, U.R.C.P. 
applies to this brief. Cabrera v. Cottrell, Id. ; Jenkins v. 
Bailey, Id. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Courts designation of Goodwins1 position as 
"deficient and impertinent" is appropriate. It is even more 
appropriate at this stage of the proceedings. This is an action 
where the principal amount of the debt is less than $5,000.00. 
Yet, the legal costs of meeting the various appellcite tactics and 
new arguments of Goodwins have now exceeded the principal amount 
sought in the action. Mr. Goodwin, as an attorney, has availed 
himself of every delay and hindrance permitted by law. These 
actions do not reflect well upon the legal profession. 
Goodwins knowingly defaulted on the payments due under 
the Note and knowingly failed to pay the property taxes for five 
(5) years. The property was lost at a tax sale and Sacos brought 
an action for collection of the balance due on the Note. Goodwins 
have raised a smoke screen by references to the "One Action Rule" 
and to the lack of a named trustee on the trust deed. No facts 
have been shown by Goodwins to demonstrate that there is any excuse 
for their failure to pay the amounts due on the Note. Sacos she / 1 
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not be required to take an action to foreclose a trust deed which 
has been extinguished by a tax sale. Also, since trustees or 
beneficiaries should not be required to step in and remedy defaults 
by trustors under the trust deed, the form of the trust deed is not 
relevant. 
A denial of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and an 
award for an additional attorney's fees is appropriate, not only 
under the terms of the Note, but also as an example under Rule 11 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that Mr. Goodwin has failed 
in his responsibility as a defendant and as an attorney. 
DATED this day of June, 1989. 
BRYAN W. CANNON 
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH 
Attorney for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
c/ 
I do hereby declared that I caused to be mailed^a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, this 
of June, 1989 to the following: 
David 0. Black, Esq. 
Attorney for Petitioners 
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600 




"This is a legal ly binding form, if not understood, sock competent advice." 
1. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this l Q t h day of fclay , A. D., 19-13—, 
by and between I R I S B. SliAKLfi , 3 WOKS"., 
hereinafter designated as the Seller, and g . RAYMOND GOODWIN and SUSAN L . GOODWIN , h i 3 Wlf fi , afl 
joint tenants, _ _ 
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of C o u n t y o f S a l t L a k e
 J S t a t e o f U t a h 
2.. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer, 
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situate in 
the county of Summit , State of Utah, to-wit: gymmit p a r k 
AOORCSf 
More particularly described as follows: 
All of Lot 311 Summit Park Plat "A** Subdivision, according to the o f f i c i a l plat 
thereof on f i l e and of record in the of f ice of the Recorder of Summit Countyf Utah, 
ALSO: The Northwesterly one-half of Lot No. 32 t Summit Park Plat "A" Subdivision, 
according to the o f f i c i a l plat thereof on f i l e and of record in the of f ice of the 
Recorder of Summit County, Utah, and more part icular ly described as fo l lows: 
Beginning at the most Northerly corner of Lot No. 32, Summit Park Plat "A", according 
to the o f f i c i a l plat thereof and running thence South 48*40' East 41.25 f e e t ; thence 
South 43*20' West 195.28 f e e t ; thence North 38*10'53" West 44.99 f e e t ; thence North 
44*20' East 187.32 feet to the point of beginning. 
3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of — 
***NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND N O / 1 0 0 * * *
 D o l l a r s ( j 9 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 i 
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order , . 
strictly within the following times, to-wit: ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ( $ 1 , 0 9 0 , 0 0 ) 
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of $ 9 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 shall be paid as follows: 
$100.00 on or before the 10th day of June, 1978 and $100.00 on or before the 10th 
day of each and every month thereafter until both interest and principal are paid in 
full. 
Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the 1 Of h day of May , 19 7fl , 
4. Said monthly payments are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the 
principal. Interest shall be charged from May 10^ 1Q78
 0n all unpaid portions of the 
purchase price at the rate of NINE per cent ( 2 %) per annum. The Buyer, at his option at anytime, 
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage 
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future 
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is made. 
5. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according 
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture 
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller. 
6. It is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of 
- NONE
 wjtj1 a n unpaid balance of 
$ , as of 
7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said prem-
ises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said prop-
erty, except the following NHNR 
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the 
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed NINE percent 
( 9—<fo) per annum and payable in regular monthly installments; provided that the aggregate monthly installment 
payments required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater than each installment payment required to be 
made by the Buyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such 
loAns and mortg&ges the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property 
subject to said loans and mortgages. 
9. If the Buyer desires to exercise his right through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obli-
gations outstanding at date of this agreement against said property, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and 
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect 
to obligations against said property incurred by seller, after date of this agreement, shall be paid by seller unless 
said obligations are assumed or approved by buyer. 
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of such 
amount as can be secured under the regulations of said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon 
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-half the expenses necessary in ob-
taining said loan, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one-half, provided however, that the monthly payments and 
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest rate as outlined above. 
11. The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed 
and which may become due on these premises during the lite of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees 
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following: 
NONE 
A-i 
12 The Buyer agreos to pay the general taxes after , MAY i n . 107JL 
lu uun^-uuns a^ams* s^ia property 
days thereafter, the 
13 The Buyer further agrees to keep all insurable buildings and improvements on said premises insured in a com-
pany acceptable to the Seller in the amount of not loss than the unpaid balance on this contrzei, or $ NONE 
and to assign said insurance to the Seller as his interests may appear and to deliver the insurance policy to 1. m 
14 In the event the Bu>er shall default in the payment of any special or general taxes, assessments or insurance 
premiums as herein provided, the Seller may, at his option, pay said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or either 
of them, and if Seller elects so to do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, all such su-is so advanced 
and paid by him, together with interest thereon !rom date ot payment ot said sums at the rate of % s>£ one percent per 
month until paid 
15 Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon 
said premises, and that he will maintain said premises in good condition. 
16 In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure or the Buyer to make 
any payment or payments when the same shall become due, or within THIRTY ( 3 0 ) 
Seller, at his option shall have the following alternative remedies. 
A Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer to remedy the default within five days after written notice, 
to be released from all obligations in law and m equity to convey said property, and all payments which have 
been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for 
the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option re-enter and take 
possession of said premises without legal piocesses as in its fust and former estate, together with all improve-
ments and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements shall remain with 
the land and become the property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller, or 
B The Seller may bring suit and recover judgement for all delinquent installments, including coats and attorneys 
fees (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting 
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default) or 
C The Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare Ihe entire unpaid 
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this contract as a note and mortage, and pass 
tide to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of 
the State of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing, 
including costs and attorney's fees, and the Seller may have a judgement for any deficiency which may remain 
In the case of foreclosure the Seller hercundci, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immeuiaiuly entitled to 
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged property and collect tne -ents, issues and 
profits therefrom and apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant 
to order of the court, and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall Lc wiuitied to the possession 
of the said premises during the period of redemption 
17 It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement 
18 In the event there are any liens or encumbrances against said premises other than those herein provided for or 
referred to, or in the event any hens or encumbrances other than herein provided roi tall hereafter accrue against the 
same by acts or neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at his option, pay and disci argc the same and receive credit 
on the amount then remaining aue hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the pay-
ments herein provided to be made, may, at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until such a time as such suspended 
payments shall equal any sums advanced as aforesaid. 
19. The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned 
agrees to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the 
above described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued 
by or through the acts or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount 
of the purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time of sale or at any time during the 
term of this agreement, or at time of delivery of deed, at the option of Buyer. 
20. It i« hereby expressly unaerstood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property 
muta prascni-conditioa And that-th**o are no representations, euv*n*ii%*, or agreements between the paxUes hereto with 
reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto —NQNS 
21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenants or agreements containeu here-
in, that the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise 
or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any 
remedy orovided hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit 
or otherwise. 
22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, suc-
cessors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties to this agreement have hereunto signed their names, the day and year 
first above written
 f-v 
Signed in the presence o£» y
 yj _ i I e written the presence of*
 y ,j 
Seller 
t**0\ -2*s~5t~*£,~* 
^.rx^ C^r-^rr-^.^^ J 
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WARRANTY DEED 
IRIS B. SEARLE AND SHIRLEY J. SACOS grantor 
of , County of , State of Utah, hereby 
C O N V E Y and W A R R A N T to 
GEORGE RAYMOND GOODWIN AND SUSAN LYNN OLSON GOODWIN 
grantee 
of Saiattit*County7»UEah : for the sum of 
TEN AND NO/100 and other good and valuable considerations DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land In Summit County, 
State of Utah: 
All of Lot 31, Summit Park Plat "A" Subdivision, according to the official plat 
thereof on file and of record in the office of the Recorder of Summit County, Utah, 
ALSO: The Northwesterly one-half of Lot Ho. 32, Summit Park Plat "A" Subdivision 
according to the official plat thereof on file and of record in the office of the 
Recorder of Summit County, Utah, and more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at the most Northerly corner of Lot No. 32, Summit Park Plat "AM according 
to the official plat thereof and running thenceTcaith 48° 40' East 41.25 feet; thence 
South 43°20' West 195.28 feet; thence North 38°10,53u West 44.99 feet; thence North 
44O201 East 187.32 feet to the point of beginning. 
This deed is given for the purpose of conveying to the grantee'herein, all right, 
title and interest which the grantors herein may have acquired in and to the property 
herein before described, or any portion thereof, by virtue of an agreement to convey 
executed by the persons named as purported by a Uniform Real Estate Contract dated 
May 10, 1978. 
WITNESS, the hand T of said grantor s , this 3 7 ^ day of c£ 
£<r+,~L* .A.D.197? <2 
.n Signed in the Presence of 
SHIRLEY j./SAfcjtfs 
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, as Trustee, • and 
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My Commission Expi** 
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•MOTE* Tr\iit«« m t b# * n>jm^*r °^  ***• Uuh Suit 3ir: « h*nk. buildinf ind loaa m»*xi*iion or a^/tn** ami 
l^ aiv AAaocl* i\0fl 4 u t h o r , I r ^ l o ^° *^c^ bu*in«s i« Uuh; a corporation auihorucd ro do i tru*< bmmcu ,n 
must be surrendered to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made. 
NOTE SECURED BY DEED OF TRUST 
$ 7,926.77 Salt Lake City, Utah, August 13 , 
19 79 
In installments as herein stated for value received, I promise to pay to 
Iris B. Searle and Shirley J. Sacos, as joint tenants 
or order at §aic U K g City, VUh 
the sum of Seven Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty Six and- 77/100 DOLLARS 
with interest from August 10, 1979 on unpaid principal at 
the rate nine per cent per annum; principal and interest 
payable in installments of One Hundred and no/100 DOLLARS 
or more on the 10th day of September, 1979 and the 
remainder due with all accrued interest due on the 10th day of each and every 
month thereafter for a period of ten (10) years or until paid in full. _, 
Each payment shall be credited first on interest then due and the remainder 
en principal; and interest shall thereupon cease upon the principal so credited, 
Should default be made in payment of any installment when ude the whole sum of 
principal and interest shall become immediately due at the option of the holder 
of this note. Principal and interest payable in lawful money of the United 
States. If action be instituted on this note I promise to pay such sum as the 




^^^~^ < y ^ ^ /!xL<r>x^ /CAzsri^^ 
SUSAN LYN OLSON GOODWIN fl 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of 
On die / 3 ^ ^ day of diu^ctjj- A. D. one 
thousand nine hundred and 7 ^ o personally appeared before me (ac^ra^ 
the signec*>f the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that ^Tkey^xecuced the 
same. x^~ /// 4A 
* "^^  -. iNoTary Fuolir. 
My commission expires $*'/-?Z Address: $*o(.^ U</^c ^ 4 
U-Uu BLANK NO 103— 0 - » M 'TO ID — J i l l SO :»OQ CAST — SALT H K « CITY 
Tax Deed 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate and politic of the state of Utah. Grantor, hereby 
conveys to MnaIdJ.»..liolbgr^...Jx* 
— — Grantee, of 
215..^prth_State. .Street.A...^alt;...La>:^..(:it7 ^ffAh.^84103 „ 
the following described real estate in SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH: 
SU-A-31-32 LOTS 3i h NW^*Y'h OF LOT 32 PLAT A SUMMIT PARK SUBDIVISION 
*( See 1980 TAx Sale Record, Book 3, page 976) 
j Emry No. ~ < 2 3 5 7 S 8 
j REQUEST OF $rrn$^^< ^^^-uf^yZ/ 
ALAN SPRJGGS. SUMMIT CO. «K0KCER FEE 
By {rAirtituC 
{ RECORDED .. /a ~ A ^ ~ A 5 a t - / * ? t ^T& M 
This conveyance is made in consideration of payment by the Grantee of the sum of 5 
183AJ3UL. delinquent taxes, penalties, interest and costs, constituting a charge against said 
real estate, which was sold to said County at preliminary sale for non-payment of general 
. i \ i S ^ i m i i ^ % « n R it for the year 19„8&. in the sum of %MM.. 
* f £ - ; i & W « * * » -^fcS- .aay. of i - J ! H a « - 19 VL. 
*• --Co 
*••. • » / « .'*«» 
V ^ SUMMIT CDt 
'*?;* • ••. v 
A-G 
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FILE NO. C.96- S7V/ 
TITLE: ( • PARTIES PRESENT) COUNSEL: (^ COUNSEL PRESENT) 
sjfl<t<> &>Jrt >/?A (o 
IZ7/JK<JJZ ry?c//7?ssr» <A ^LY/UK^ 
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57-1-19. Trust deeds — Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "Beneficiary11 means the person named or otherwise designated in a 
trust deed as the person for whose benefit a trust deed is given, or his 
successor in interest. 
(2) "Trustor" means the person conveying real property by a trust deed 
as security for the performance of an obligation. 
(3) "Trust deed" means a deed executed in conformity with this act and 
conveying real property to a trustee in trust to secure the performance of 




(4) "Trustee" means a person to whom title to real property is conveyed 
by trust deed, or his successor in interest. 
(5) "Real property" means any estate or interest in land, including all 
buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights 
of way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, heredita-
ments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, used or en-
joyed with said land, or any part thereof. 
(6) "Trust property" means the real property conveyed by the trust 
deed. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 1. and subdivision (3) apparently refers to L. 
Meaning of "this act". — The phrase "this 1961, ch. 181 which enacted this section and 
act" appearing in the introductory language §§ 57-1-20 to 57-1-36. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 5. 
§ 15 et seq. Key Numbers. — Mortgages «=» 1. 
57-1-20. Transfers in trust of real property — Purposes — 
Effect. 
Transfers in trust of real property may be made to secure the performance 
of an obligation of the trustor or any other person named in the trust deed to a 
beneficiary. All right, title, interest and claim in and to the trust property 
acquired by the trustor, or his successors in interest, subsequent to the execu-
tion of the trust deed, shall inure to the trustee as security for the obligation 
or obligations for which the trust property is conveyed in like manner as if 
acquired before execution of the trust deed. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 2. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 6. 
Key Numbers. — Mortgages t» 1. 
57-1-21. Trustees of trust deeds — Qualifications* 
(1) The trustee of a trust deed shall be: 
(a) any member of the Utah State Bar; 
(b) any bank, building and loan association, savings and loan associa-
tion, or insurance company authorized to do business in Utah under the 
laws of Utah or the United States; 
(c) any corporation authorized to conduct a trust business in Utah un-
der the laws of Utah or the United States; 
(d) any title insurance or abstract company authorized to do business 
in Utah under the laws of Utah; 
(e) any agency of the United States government; or 
(0 any association or corporation which is licensed, chartered, or regu-
lated by the Farm Credit Administration or its successor. 
401 
57-1-22 REAL ESTATE 
This subsection is not applicable to a trustee of a trust deed existing 
prior to the effective date of this chapter, nor to any agreement which is 
supplemental to that trust deed. 
(2) The trustee of a trust deed may not be the beneficiary therein, unless 
the beneficiary is qualified to be a trustee under Subsection (1) (b), (c), (e), or 
if). 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 3; 1963, ch. substituted "Subsection (1) (b), (c), (e), or (ff 
110, § 1; 1969, ch. 162, § 1; 1985, ch. 64, § 1, for "clause (b), <c) or (e) of subsection (1)" at the 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend., end of Subsection (2). 
ment added Subsection (l)(f); deleted "Clauses Meaning of "effective date of this chap-
(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e)" at the beginning of the ter". — The phrase "effective date of this chap-
undesignated paragraph at the end of Subsec- ter" appearing in the undesignated paragraph 
tion (1) and substituted "chapter, nor to any at the end of Subsection (1) first appeared in 
agreement which is supplemental to that trust this section as amended by L. 1985, ch. 64, § 1. 
deed'1 for "act, nor to any indenture supplemen- That act (L. 1985, ch. 64) took effect on April 
tal thereto" at the end of that paragraph; and 29, 1985. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages §§ 8, 84. 
Key Numbers. — Mortgages <*=» 24. 
57-1-22. Successor trustees — Appointment by beneficiary 
— Effect — Substitution of trustee — Recording 
— Form. 
(1) The beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for 
record in the office of the county recorder of each county in which the trust 
property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From the 
time the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all 
the power, duties, authority and title of the trustee named in the deed of trust 
and of any successor trustee. 
(2) The substitution shall identify the trust deed by stating the names of 
the original parties thereto and the date of recordation and the book and page 
where the same is recorded or the entry number, shall state the name of the 
new trustee and shall be executed and acknowledged by all of the beneficiar-
ies under the trust deed, or their successors in interest. 
(3) If not previously recorded, at the time of recording the notice of default, 
the successor trustee shall file for record the substitution of trustee, and a 
copy thereof shall be sent in the manner provided in § 57-1-26 to all persons 
to whom a copy of the notice of default would be required to be mailed by 
§ 57-1-26. In addition thereto, a copy shall be sent to the prior trustee by 
regular mail to his last known address. 




Substitution of Trustee 
(insert name and address of new trustee) 
is hereby appointed successor trustee under the trust deed executed by 
as trustor, in which is named beneficiary and 
as trustee, and filed for record , 19 , and recorded in Book 
, Page , Records of County, (or filed for record 
, 19 , with recorder's entry No. , County), 
Utah. 
Signature z_ 1 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 4; 1981, ch. of revocation and prima facie value of affidavit 
100, § 1. attached to the substitution of trustee; and re-
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amend- designated former Subsection (6> as present 
ment rewrote Subsection (3); deleted former Subsection (4). For prior version, see parent 
Subsections (4) and (5), concerning publication volume. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 85. 
Key Numbers. — Mortgages <*=» 24. 
57-1-23. Sale of trust property — Power of trustee — Fore-
closure of trust deed. 
A power of sale is hereby conferred upon the trustee which the trustee may 
exercise and under which the trust property may be sold in the manner here-
inafter provided, after a breach of an obligation for which the trust property is 
conveyed as security; or, at the option of the beneficiary, a trust deed may be 
foreclosed in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on 
real property. The power of sale may be exercised by the trustee without 
express provision therefor in the trust deed. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 5. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Joint tenancies. 
Mortgage foreclosure method. 
Joint tenancies. 
The rule that a joint tenancy is severed by 
one tenant's conveyance applies not only to vol-
untary conveyances, but also to involuntary 
conveyances pursuant to judicial rules. Jolley 
v. Corry, 671 P.2d 139 (Utah 1983). 
Where a joint tenant defaulted on her obliga-
tion to a mortgagee, her subsequent purchase 
of the property at a judicial sale was deemed to 
be for the benefit of all cotenants. Jolley v. 
Corry, 671 P.2d 139 (Utah 1983). 
Mortgage foreclosure method. 
Defendant could not claim error where plain-
tiff sought to foreclose on a trust deed in the 
manner provided for foreclosure of mortgages, 
even though, in selecting the alternative rem-
edy, plaintiff obtained costs and attorney fees 
far in excess of those provided for in § 57-1-31. 
Security Title Co. v. Payless Bldrs. Supply, 17 
Utah 2d 179, 407 P.2d 141 (1965). 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 555. sion in mortgage or deed of trust, 69 A.L.R.3d 
A.L.R. — Failure to keep up insurance as 774. 
justifying foreclosure under acceleration provi- Key Numbers. — Mortgages «•» 341. 
57-1-24. Sale of trust property by trustee — Notice of de-
fault. 
The power of sale herein conferred upon the trustee shall not be exercised 
until: 
(a) the trustee shall first file for record, in the office of the recorder of 
each county wherein the trust property or some part or parcel thereof is 
situated, a notice of default, identifying the trust deed by stating the 
name of the trustor named therein and giving the book and page where 
the same is recorded or a description of the trust property, and containing 
a statement that a breach of an obligation for which the trust property 
was conveyed as security has occurred, and setting forth the nature of 
such breach and of his election to sell or cause to be sold such property to 
satisfy the obligation; 
(b) not less than three months shall thereafter elapse; and 
(c) after the lapse of at least three months the trustee shall give notice 
of sale as provided in this act. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 6; 1967, ch. 
131, § 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Three-month time period. ruptcy court, does not suspend the running of 
Rule 601 of the Bankruptcy Act, which pro- the three-month time period required! by this 
vides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition section. McCarthy v. Lewis, 615 P.2d 1256 
shall operate as a stay of any act to enforce a (Utah 1980). 
lien against property in custody of the bank-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 557. 
Key Numbers. — Mortgages «=» 346. 
57-1-25. Notice of trustee's sale — Description of property 
— Time and place of sale. 
(1) The trustee shall give written notice of the time and place of sale partic-
ularly describing the property to be sold (a) by publication of such notice, at 
least three times, once a week for three consecutive weeks, the last publica-
tion to be at least 10 days but not more than 30 days prior to the sale, in some 
newspaper having a general circulation in each county in which the property 
to be sold, or some part thereof, is situated, and (b) by posting such notice, at 
least 20 days before the date of sale, in some conspicuous place on the property 
to be sold and also in at least three public places of each city or county in 
which the property to be sold, or some part thereof, is situated. 
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(2) The sale shall be held at the time and place designated in the notice of 
sale which shall be between the hours of 9 o'clock a.m. and 5 o'clock p.m. and 
at the courthouse of the county in which the property to be sold, or some part 
thereof, is situated. 
(3) The notice of sale shall be sufficient if made in substantially the follow-
ing form: 
Notice of Trustee's Sale 
The following described property will, be sold at public auction to the 
highest bidder, payable in lawful money of the United States at the time 
of sale, at the in , County, Utah, on , 
19 , at m. of said day, for the purpose of foreclosing a trust deed 
executed by . and , his wife, as trustors, in favor of 
, covering real property located at , and more particu-
larly described as: 
(Insert description) 
Dated , 19 
Trustee 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 7; 1981, ch. ment substituted "city or county" in Subsection 
100, § 2. (1) for "precinct or city"; and rewrote the form 
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amend- in Subsection (3). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 563. 
Key Numbers. — Mortgages <*=» 352. 
57-1-26. Requests for copies of notice of default and notice 
of sale — Mailing by trustee or beneficiary — 
Publication of notice of default. 
(1) Any person desiring a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of 
sale under any trust deed may, at any time subsequent to the filing for record 
of the trust deed and prior to the filing for record of a notice of default there-
under, file for record in the office of the county recorder of any county in which 
any part or parcel of the trust property is situated, a duly acknowledged 
request for a copy of any such notice of default and notice of sale. The request 
shall set forth the name and address of the person or persons requesting copies 
of such notices and shall identify the trust deed by stating the names of the 
original parties thereto, the date of filing for record thereof, and the book and 
page where the same is recorded or the recorder's entry number and shall be 
in substantially the following form: 
Request is hereby made that a copy of any notice of default and a copy 
of notice of sale under the trust deed filed for record , 19 , and 
recorded in Book , Page , Records of County, (or 
filed for record , 19 , with recorder's entry number , 
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County), Utah, executed by as trustor, in which is 
named as beneficiary and as trustee, be mailed to (in-
sert name) _ _ _ at (insert address) (signature) 
Upon filing for record of such request, the recorder shall index such request in 
the mortgagor's index, mortgagee's index, and abstract record. Except as pro-
vided in this section the trustee under any such deed of trust shall not be 
required to send notice of default or notice of sale to any person not filing a 
request for notice as described herein. 
(2) Not later than 10 days after -recordation of such notice of default, the 
trustee or beneficiary shall mail, by certified or registered mail, with postage 
prepaid, a copy of such notice with the recording date shown thereon, ad-
dressed to each person whose name and address are set forth in a request 
therefor which has been recorded prior to the filing for record of the notice of 
default, directed to the address designated in said request; and at least 20 
days before the date of sale, the trustee shall mail, by certified or registered 
mail, with postage prepaid, a copy of the notice of the time and place of sale, 
addressed to each person whose name and address are set forth in a request 
therefor which has been recorded prior to the filing for record of the notice of 
default, directed to the address designated in said request. 
(3) Any trust deed may contain a request that a copy of any notice of default 
and a copy of any notice of sale thereunder shall be mailed to any person a 
party thereto at the address of such person set forth therein, and a copy of any 
notice of default and of any notice of sale shall be mailed to each such person 
at the same time and in the same manner required as though a separate 
request therefor had been filed by each of such persons as provided in this 
section. 
(4) If no address of the trustor is set forth in the trust deed and if no request 
for notice by such trustor has been recorded as provided in this section, a copy 
of the notice of default shall be published at least three times, once a week for 
three consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in each county 
in which the trust property, or some part thereof, is situated, such publication 
to commence not later than 10 days after the filing for record of the notice of 
default. In lieu of such publication, a copy of the notice of default may be 
delivered personally to the trustor within such 10 days or at any time before 
publication is completed. 
(5) No request for a copy of any notice filed for record pursuant to this 
section, nor any statement or allegation in any such request, nor any record 
thereof, shall affect the title to trust property or be deemed notice to any 
person that any person requesting copies of notice of default or of notice of sale 
has or claims any right, title or interest in, or lien or claim upon, the trust 
property. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 8; 1980, ch. 57, Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amend-




C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 566. 
Key Numbers. — Mortgages c=» 354. 
57-1-27. Sale of trust property by trustee — Public auction 
— Conduct by attorney for trustee — Trustor 
may direct order in which trust property sold — 
Bids — Postponement of. sale. 
On the date and at the time and place designated in the notice of sale, the 
trustee or the attorney for the trustee shall sell the property at public auction 
to the highest bidder. The trustee, or the attorney for the trustee may conduct 
the sale and act at such sale as the auctioneer. The trustor, or his successor in 
interest, if present at the sale, may direct the order in which the trust prop-
erty shall be sold when such property consists of several known lots or parcels 
which can be sold to advantage separately, and the trustee, or the attorney for 
the trustee, shall follow such directions. Any person, including the beneficiary 
or trustee, may bid at the sale. Every bid is considered an irrevocable offer, 
and if the purchaser refuses to pay the amount bid by him for the property 
sold to him at the sale, the trustee, or the attorney for the trustee, may again 
sell the property at any time to the highest bidder. The party refusing to pay 
the bid price is liable for any loss occasioned thereby, including interest, costs, 
and trustee's and reasonable attorney's fees. The trustee or the attorney for 
the trustee may thereafter reject any other bid of such person. 
The person conducting the sale may, for any cause he considers expedient, 
postpone the sale up to a period not to exceed 72 hours. Notice of such post-
ponement shall be given by public declaration thereof by such person at the 
time and place last appointed for the sale. No other notice of the postponed 
sale need be given unless the sale is postponed for longer than 72 hours 
beyond the date designated in the notice of sale. In the event of a longer 
postponement, the sale shall be cancelled and renoticed as provided for herein 
in the same manner as the original notice of sale is required to be given. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 9; 1985, ch. 68, 
§ 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend-
ment, in the first paragraph, inserted "or the 
attorney for the trustee" in four places, in-
serted "trustee, or the" at the beginning and 
deleted "for the trustee" at the end of the sec-
ond sentence, inserted "or trustee" in the 
fourth sentence, substituted "bid is considered" 
for "bid shall be deemed" and "property sold" 
for "property struck off' in the fifth sentence, 
divided the former sixth sentence into the 
present sixth and seventh sentences by substi-
tuting "the bid price" for "shall be" near the 
beginning and adding "including interest, 
costs, and trustee's and reasonable attorney's 
fees" at the end of the sixth sentence and delet-
ing "also, in his discretion" following "may" in 
the seventh sentence: and. in the second para-
graph, divided the former first sentence into 
the present first and second sentences, substi-
tuted "considers" for "deems" and "up to a pe-
riod not to exceed 72 hours" for "from time to 
time until it shall be completed and, in every 
such case, notice" at the end of the first sen-
tence, divided the former second sentence into 
the present third and fourth sentences, substi-
tuted "72 hours" for "one day" and "date" for 
"day" near the middle of the third sentence, 
and substituted "In the event of a longer post-
ponement, the sale shall be cancelled and 
renoticed as provided for herein" for "in which 
event notice thereof shall be given" at the be-
ginning of the fourth sentence. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C J S Mortgages § 569 as contempt of court, 54 A L R 3d 1242 
A.L.R. — Mortgagors interference with Key Numbers, — Mortgages «=» 361 
property subject to order of foreclosure and sale 
57-1-28. Sale of trust property by trustee — Payment of 
bid — Trustee's deed delivered to purchaser — 
Recitals — Effect, 
(1) The purchaser at the sale shall pay the price bid as directed by the 
trustee and upon receipt of payment, the trustee shall execute and deliver his 
deed to such purchaser The trustee's deed may contain recitals of compliance 
with the requirements of §§ 57-1-19 through 57-1-36 relating to the exercise 
of the power of sale and sale of the property described therein, including 
recitals concerning any mailing, personal delivery, and publication of the 
notice of default, any mailing and the publication and posting of the notice of 
sale, and the conduct of sale These recitals constitute prima facie evidence of 
such compliance and are conclusive evidence in favor of bona fide purchasers 
and encumbrancers for value and without notice 
(2) The trustee's deed shall operate to convey to the purchaser, without 
right of redemption, the trustee's title and all right, title, interest, and claim 
of the trustor and his successors in interest and of all persons claiming by, 
through, or under them, in and to the property sold, including all such right, 
title, interest, and claim m and to such property acquired by the trustor or his 
successors m interest subsequent to the execution of the trust deed. 
History: L- 1961, ch. 181, § 10; 1985, ch. for "this act" and inserted "the" before "notice 
68, § 2. of sale" in the second sentence, and substituted 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend- "These recitals constitute" for "and such re-
ment, m Subsection (1) deleted "forthwith" citals shall constitute" at the beginning and 
before "pay the price' and inserted "as directed substituted "are conclusive evidence" for "con-
by the trustee" near the beginning of the first
 c l u s i v e evidence thereof* near the middle of 
sentence, divided the former second sentence
 t h e t m r d s e n t ence and made minor changes in 
into the present second and third sentences
 p u n c t u a t l 0 n m Subsection (2) 
substituted 'Sections 57-1-19 through 57-1-36" 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C J S Mortgages § 584 
Key Numbers. — Mortgages *» 374 
57-1-29. Proceeds of trustee's sale — Disposition. 
The trustee shall apply the proceeds of the trustee's sale, first, to the costs 
and expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the 
payment of the trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred not to exceed 
the amount which may be provided for in the trust deed, second, to payment of 
the obligation secured by the trust deed, and the balance, if any, to the person 
or persons legally entitled thereto, or the trustee, in his discretion, may de-
posit the balance of such proceeds with the county clerk of the county in which 
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the sale took place. Upon depositing such balance, the trustee shall be dis-
charged from all further responsibility therefor and the county clerk shall 
deposit the same with the county treasurer subject to the order of the district 
court of said county. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, * 11. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Duties of trustee. in order to assist certain interest holders at the 
A trustee under trust deed has an afTirma- expense of others. Randall v. Valley Title, 681 
tive duty to uphold his statutory responsibili- P.2d 219 (Utah 1984). 
Lies, and may not ignore those responsibilities 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C.J S. Mortgages * 596. 
Key Numbers. — Mortgages c=» 376. 
57-1-30. Sale of trust property by trustee — Corporate 
stock evidencing water rights given to secure 
trust deed. 
Shares of corporate stock evidencing water rights used, intended to be used, 
or suitable for use on the trust property and which are hypothecated to secure 
an obligation secured by a trust deed may be sold with the trust property, or 
any part thereof, at the trustee's sale in the manner provided in this act. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, $ 12. ently refers to L. 1961, ch. 181 which enacted 
Meaning of "this act". — The phrase "this this section and §§ 57-1-20 to 57-1-29 and 
act" appearing at the end of this section appar- 57-1-31 to 57-1-36. 
57-1-31. Trust deeds — Default in performance of obliga-
tions secured — Reinstatement— Cancellation of 
recorded notice of default. 
(1) Whenever all or a portion of the principal sum of any obligation secured 
by a trust deed has, prior to the maturity date fixed in such obligation, become 
due or been declared due by reason of a breach or default in the performance 
of any obligation secured by the trust deed, including a default in the payment 
of interest or of any installment of principal, or by reason of failure of the 
trustor to pay, in accordance with the terms of the trust deed, taxes, assess-
ments, premiums for insurance, or advances made by the beneficiary in accor-
dance with terms of such obligation or of such trust deed, the trustor or his 
successor in interest in the trust property or any part thereof or any other 
person having a subordinate lien or encumbrance of record thereon or any 
beneficiary under a subordinate trust deed, at any time within three months 
of the filing for record of notice of default under such trust deed, if the power of 
sale is to be exercised, may pay to the beneficiary or his successor in interest 
the entire amount then due under the terms of such trust deed (including 
costs and expenses actually incurred in enforcing the terms of such obligation, 
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or trust deed, and the trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred) other 
man such portion .,1 the principal as would not then be due had no default 
occurred, and thereby cure the default theretofore existing and, thereupon, all 
proceedings theretofore had or instituted shall be dismissed or discontinued 
and the obligation and trust deed shall be reinstated and shall be and remain 
m i w r . f / ? e C f lh<! s a m o a s i f n o s u c h acceleration had occurred. 
U) If the default is cured and the trust deed reinstated in the manner 
provided in Subsection (1), the beneficiary, or his assignee, shall, on demand 
ot any person having an interest in the trust property, execute and deliver to 
him a request to the trustee to execute, acknowledge, and deliver a cancella-
tion of the recorded notice of defaujt. under such trust deed; and any benefi-
aary under a trust deed, or his assignee, who, for a period of 30 days after 
such demand refuses to request the trustee to execute and deliver such can-
cellation is liable to the person entitled to such request for all damages result-
ing from such refusal. A release and reconveyance given by the trustee or 
Deneticiary, or both, or the execution of a trustee's deed constitutes a cancella-
tion of a notice of default. Otherwise, a cancellation of a recorded notice of 
default under a trust deed is, when acknowledged, entitled to be recorded and 
is sufficient if made and executed by the trustee in substantially the following 
Cancellation of Notice of Default 
The undersigned hereby cancels the notice of default filed for record 
19 and_record in Book , Page , Records of 
County, (or filed of record , 19 , with recorder's entry 
N o
 ' County), Utah, which notice of default refers to the 
trust deed executed by as trustor, in which is named as 
beneficiary and as trustee, and filed for record . 19 , 
and recorded in Book Page , Records of . 
County, (or filed of record , 19 , with recorder's entry No. 
, County\ Utah. 
(legal description) 
Signature of Trustee 
, ^ 1 ^ L. 1961, ch. 181, § 13: 1967. ch. The 1985 amendment designated the for-
131, i 2; 1981, ch. 100, § 4; 1985. ch. 68, $ 3.
 m e r ly undesignated paragraphs an Subsections 
- ^ 5 ! ^ ? " * * 7" T h e f981 ftmend- (1) and (2); deleted "or. otherwise at any time 
fifty d ^ 0 r n o ° l e h l ! f o ' ^ '" * a p p r e R a u e P " " * the entry of the decree of foreclosure" 
liny dollars or one-naif of one percent ot the , * ,
 i L . , . , , 4. u » 
entire unpaid principal sum secured which- a n d a n d t h e o b h * a t I o n secured thereby near 
ever is greater" after "fees actually incurred" t h e m i d d l e o f Subsection (1); substituted "in 
at the end of the parenthetical phrase in the t n e m a n n e r provided in Subsection (1)" for "in 
first sentence; inserted the third sentence: in- t n e manner hereinabove provided" near the De-
serted "Otherwise" at the beirinninc of the ginning and deleted "be" near the end of Sub-
fourth sentence; inserted "(legal description)" section (2); and made minor changes in phrase-
in the form; and made minor changes in phra- ology and punctuation, 
seology, punctuation and style. 
CONVEYANCES 57-1-32 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages $ 550. 
I\ey Numbers. — Mortgages c=» 334. 
37-1-32, Sale of trust property by trustee — Action to re-
cover balance due upon obligation for which 
trust deed was given as security — Collection of 
costs and attorney's fees/ 
At any time within three months after any sale of property under a trust 
!eed. as hereinabove provided, an action may be commenced to recover the 
valance due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given as secu-
-ity, and in such action the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the 
indebtedness which was secured by such trust deed, the amount for which 
vuch property was sold, and the fair market value thereof at the date of sale. 
Before rendering judgment, the court shall find the fair market value at the 
• late of sale of the property sold. The court may not render judgment for more 
than the amount by which the amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs, 
-md expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the fair 
:narket value of the property as of the date of the sale. In any action brought 
.inder this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and 
reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing an action under this section. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 14; 1985, ch. and third sentences; added the fourth sentence; 
••*. $ 4. and made minor changes in phraseology and 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend- punctuation, 
nent deleted language from the end of the first 




Exclusive remedy. Out-of-state lands. 
This statute provides the exclusive remedy Deficiency judgment protection requiring 
for securing a deficiency judgment following a that fair market value of property at time of 
sale of real property under a trust deed, sale be used as setoff is not extended to debtors 
thereby precluding the pursuance of any other whose obligations are secured by trust deeds on 
remedy once the sale has been made. Cox v. land outside Utah. Bullington v. Mize, 25 Utah 
Oreen (Utah 1985) 696 P.2d 1209. 2d 173, 478 P.2d 500, 44 A.L.R.3d 910 (1970). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages $ 599. 
Key Numbers. — Mortgages <*» 375. 
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57-1-33. Satisfaction of obligation secured by trust deed—* 
Reconveyance of trust property. 
When the obligation secured by any trust deed has been satisfied, the 
trustee shall, upon written request by the beneficiary, reconvey the trust 
property. The reconveyance may designate the grantee therein as "the person 
or persons entitled thereto." The beneficiary under such trust deed shall de-
liver to the trustor or his successor in interest the trust deed and the note or 
other evidence of the obligation so satisfied-Any beneficiary under such trust 
deed who refuses to request a reconveyance from the trustee for a period of 
thirty days after written demand therefor is made by the trustor or his succes-
sor in interest shall be liable to the trustor or his successor in interest, as the 
case may be, for double damages resulting from such refusal, or such trustor 
or his successor in interest may bring an action against the beneficiary and 
trustee to compel a reconveyance of the trust property and in such action the 
judgment of the court shall be that the trustee reconvey the trust property and 
that the beneficiary pay to the trustor, or his successor in interest, as the case 
may be, the costs of suit including a reasonable attorney's fee and all damages 
resulting from the refusal of the beneficiary to request a reconveyance as 
hereinabove provided. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 15. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Form of release. 
—Notation on deed. 
Inference created by reconveyance. 
Form of release. Inference created by reconveyance. 
—Notation on deed Trustee's reconveyance by deed of the trust 
A deed of trust to raise a fund to pay a debt d e e d created an independent inference that the 
could not be released on the margin of the obligation secured by the trust deed had been 
record, as provided by former statute, in the satisfied rather than renewed. Peterson v. 
case of a trust deed given as secuntv for a debt. United States, 511 F.Supp. 250 (D. Utah 1981). 
Dupee v. Rose, 10 Utah 305, 37 P.'567 (1894). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 470. 
Key Numbers. — Mortgages *» 314. 
57-1-34. Sale of trust property by trustee—Foreclosure of 
trust deed—Limitation of actions. 
The trustee's sale of property under a trust deed shall be made, or an action 
to foreclose a trust deed as provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on 
real property shall be commenced, within the period prescribed by law for the 
commencement of an action on the obligation secured by the trust deed. 
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History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 16. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 558. 
Key Numbers. — Mortgages «=» 3*45. 
57-1-35. Trust deeds—Transfer of secured debts as trans-
fer of security. 
The transfer of any debt secured by a trust deed shall operate as a transfer 
of the security therefor. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 17. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 344. 
Key Numbers. — Mortgages «=» 219. 
57-1-36. Trust deeds—Instruments entitled to be re-
corded—Assignment of a beneficial interest. 
Any trust deed, substitution of trustee, assignment of a beneficial interest 
under a trust deed, notice of default, trustee's deed, reconveyance of the trust 
property and any instrument by which any trust deed is subordinated or 
waived as to priority, when acknowledged as provided by law, shall be entitled 
ro be recorded, and shall, from the time of filing the same with the recorder for 
record, impart notice of the contents thereof to all persons, including subse-
quent purchasers and encumbrancers for value, except that the recording of 
an assignment of a beneficial interest in the trust deed shall not in itself be 
deemed notice of such assignment to the trustor, his heirs or personal repre-
sentatives, so as to invalidate any payment made by them, or any of them, to 
the person holding the note, bond or other instrument evidencing the obliga-
tion by the trust deed. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 18. 
Cross-References. — Recorder's fees, 
§ 21-2-3. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 203. 
Key Numbers. — Mortgages *» 91. 
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78-37-1. Form of action — Judgment — Special execution. 
There can be one action for the recovery of any debt or the enforcement of 
any right secured solely by mortgage upon real estate which action must be in 
accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Judgment shall be given ad-
judging the amount due, with costs and disbursements, and the sale of mort-
gaged property, or some part thereof, to satisfy said amount and accruing 
costs, and directing the sheriff to proceed and sell the same according to the 
provisions of law relating to sales on execution, and a special execution or 
order of sale shall be issued for that purpose. 
History; L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C 1943, ceedings supplemental thereto, Rule 69, 
Supp., 104-37-1; L. 1965, ch. 172, § 1. U.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Execution and pro- Trust deeds, § 57-1-19 et seq. 
Rule 24 RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
court may entertain and may grant or deny any request for relief which under 
these rules may properly be sought by motion, except that a single justice may 
not dismiss or otherwise determine an appeal or other proceeding, and except 
that the court may provide by order or rule that any motion or class of motions 
must be acted upon by the court. The action of a single justice may be re-
viewed by the court. 
(d) Form of papers; number of copies. All papers relating to motions 
may be typewritten. Except for motions to enlarge time, five copies shall be 
filed with the original, but the court may require that additional copies be 
furnished. Only the original of a motion to enlarge time shall be filed. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule relief sought, a particular statement of the fac-
adopts certain provisions of Rule 27 FRAP, as tual grounds, a memorandum of points and au-
modified to comport with Utah appellate struc- thorities (if the motion is for other than an en-
ture, and inserts additional requirements with largement of time), and affidavits and support-
regard to motion practice.
 m g papers, where appropriate. 
Paragraph (a). This paragraph requires that
 T h e r u l e i s consistent with Utah trial prac-
a motion for any order of the Supreme Court
 t i c e a n d p r o c edure. See Rule 7(b)(1) URCivP. 
contain a specific and clear statement of the 
Rule 24. Briefs-
la) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order here indicated: 
( D a complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency 
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the cap-
tion of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list 
should be set out on a separate page which appears immediately inside 
the cover. 
(2) a table of contents, with page references. 
(3) a table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, agency rules, court rules, statutes and other authorities 
cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(4) a brief statement showing the jurisdiction of this court and describ-
ing the nature of the proceedings below. 
(5) a statement of the issues presented for review. 
(6) constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regula-
tions whose interpretation is determinative shall be set out verbatim with 
the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, 
the citation alone will suffice, and in that event, the provision shall be set 
forth as provided in Paragraph (f) of this rule. 
(7) a statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly 
the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the 
court below. There shall follow a statement of the facts relevant to the 
issues presented for review. All statements of fact and references to the 
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record (see Para-
graph (e)). 
(8) summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably 
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually 
made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the 
heading under which the argument is arranged. 
(9) an argument. The argument shall contain the contentions of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented and the reasons therefor, 
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with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied 
on. 
(10) a short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(b) Brief of the respondent. The brief of the respondent shall conform to 
the requirements of Paragraph (a) of this rule, except that a statement of the 
issues or of the case need not be made unless the respondent is dissatisfied 
with the statement of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the 
respondent, and if the respondent has cross-appealed, the respondent may file 
a brief in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the 
cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set 
forth in the opposing brief. No further briefs may be filed except with leave of 
court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their 
briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such 
designations as "appellant" and "respondent." It promotes clarity to use the 
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the 
actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the 
injured person," "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the 
pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 1Kb), to pages of 
the reporter's transcript, or to pages of any statement of the evidence or 
proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). 
References to exhibits shall include exhibit numbers. If reference is made to 
evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made 
to the pages of the transcript at which the evidence was identified, offered, 
and received or rejected. 
(f) Reproduction of statutes, rules, regulations, documents, etc. If de-
termination of the issues presented requires the study of statutes, rules, regu-
lations, etc., or relevant parts thereof, to the extent not set forth under Sub-
paragraph (a)(4) [Subparagraph (a)(6)! of this rule, they shall be reproduced in 
the brief or in an addendum at the end, or they may be supplied to the court in 
pamphlet form. Copies of those parts of the record on appeal that are of central 
importance to the determination of the appeal (e.g., the challenged instruc-
tions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the con-
tract or document subject to construction, etc.) shall also be included in the 
addendum. 
(g) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs 
shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive 
of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any adden-
dum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as re-
quired by Paragraph (f) of this rule. 
(h) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the 
party first filing his notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the 
purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the 
court otherwise orders. The brief of the respondent shall contain the issues 
and arguments involved in his appeal as well as the answer to the brief of the 
appellant. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or respondents. In 
cases involving more than one appellant or respondent, including cases con-
solidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single 
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brief, and any appellant or respondent may adopt by reference any part of the 
brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant 
authorities come to the attention of a party after his brief has been filed, or 
after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the 
clerk of the court, by letter (an original and nine copies), with a copy to all 
counsel, setting forth the citations. There shall be a reference either to the 
page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but 
the letter shall without argument state the reasons for the supplemental 
citations. Any response shall be made within seven days of filing and shall be 
similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be con-
cise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and 
free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs 
which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua 
sponte by the court, and/or the court may assess attorney's fees against the 
offending lawyer. 
(1) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall comply with Rule 27. Cover 
material shall be heavyweight paper. 
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
based on Rule 28 FRAP, with certain modifica-
tions. It differs significantly from prior Rule 
75(p)(2) URCivP. 
Inadequate appellate briefs, which do not 
significantly assist the court in disposing of the 
case before it, have proved to be a significant 
problem. In order to alleviate this concern, this 
rule clearly specifies the required contents and 
order of each brief. Under Paragraph (k), briefs 
which do not comply with the requirements of 
the rule or are otherwise inadequate may be 
disregarded or stricken by the court. The court 
may also assess attorney's fees against the 
noncomplying lawyers. 
Paragraph (a)(1). This paragraph requires 
that the brief include a complete list of all par-
ties if they are not reflected in the caption of 
the case in order to permit the court to identify 
and evaluate potential conflicts of interest. 
Subdivision (a)(5). Unlike prior Rule 75(p)(2) 
URCivP, this paragraph expressly requires a 
"statement of the issues" presented for review. 
The requirement is regarded by the committee 
as particularly important. 
Subdivision (a)(6). This paragraph requires 
that constitutional provisions, statutes, ordi-
nances and regulations involved in the case be 
quoted verbatim, unless they are unduly 
lengthy. In that event, they .shall be cited and 
included in (he addendum provided for by 
Paragraph (0. 
Paragraph (a)(7). This paragraph requires 
all statements of proceedings and facts to be 
supported by references to the record. The prior 
rule contained a similar requirement, but was 
frequently disregarded in practice. This rule is 
intended to emphasize that such citations are 
required in all cases. See also Paragraph (e). 
Subdivision (a)(8). This paragraph requires a 
summary of the argument in all cases. This 
departure from Rule 24 FRAP was made be-
cause such summaries were found to be of sub-
stantial assistance to the court. 
Paragraph (f). The provision for an adden-
dum has no counterpart in prior practice. 
Paragraph (g). The limit of 50 pages for the 
opening brief of appellant and respondent's an-
swering brief is the same as under prior Utah 
practice, Rule 75(p)(2) URCivP. The 25-page 
limit on reply briefs differs from prior Utah 
practice and coincides with the page limitation 
under Rule 28(g) FRAP. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
ment inserted present Subdivision (a)(4), re-
designated former Subdivisions (a)(4) to (a)(9) 
as present Subdivisions (a)(5) to (a)(10), substi-
tuted "(an original and 9 copies), with a copy 
to" for "with a copy o f in the first sentence in 
Subdivision (j), and made a series of minor 
punctuation and word changes throughout 
Subdivision (a). 
Compiler's Notes. — The reference to Sub-
division (a)(4) in the first sentence in Subdivi-
sion (f) seems incorrect. Subdivision (a)(4) re-
lates to a statement showing the jurisdiction of 
the court. Subdivision (a)(6) relates to statutes, 
rules and regulations. 
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TITLE VL JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO COURT OF APPEALS. 
Rule 42. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of 
Court of Appeals. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, an order, and a 
decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be 
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah. 
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.) 
Rule 43. Considerations governing review of certiorari. 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discre-
tion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons 
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the 
court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered: 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in 
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the 
same issue of law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of 
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of this 
court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that 
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call 
for an exercise of this court's power of supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of 
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled 
by this court. 
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.) 
Rule 44. Certification and transmission of record; filing; 
parties. 
(a) Appearance, docketing fee, filing, and service. Counsel for the peti-
tioner shall, within the time provided by Rule 45, pay the certiorari docketing 
fee and file, with proof of service as provided by Rule 21, ten copies of a 
petition which shall comply in all respects with Rule 46. The case then will be 
placed on the certiorari docket of the court. Counsel for the petitioner shall 
serve four copies of the petition on counsel for each party separately repre-
sented. It shall be the duty of counsel for the petitioner to notify all parties in 
the case of the date of filing and of the certiorari docket number of the case. 
Service and notice shall be given as required by Rule 21. 
(b) Joint and separate petitions. Parties interested jointly, severally, or 
otherwise in a decision may join in a petition for a writ of certiorari; any one 
or more of them may petition separately; or any two or more of them may join 
in a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be reviewed on certiorari 
and involve identical or closely related questions, it will suffice to file a single 
petition for a writ of certiorari covering all the cases. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am J u r 2d Motions, Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action 
Rules, and Orders $ 1 et seq., 61A Am. Ju r 2d as affected by opponent's motion for summary 
Pleading $& 1 et seq., 238 judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or di-
C.J.S. — 60 C.J.S Motions and Orders * 1 rected verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113. 
et seq.; 71 CJ .S . Pleading ^ 63 to 210, 140 et Key Numbers. — Motions c=» 1 et seq.; 
seq., 211 et seq. Pleading <s= 38Vj to 186, 187 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Proceeding for summary judgment 
as affected bv presentation of counterclaim, 8 
AL.R.3d 1361. 
Rule 8. General rules of pleadings. 
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, 
whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, 
shall contain ( D a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to 
which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several differ-
ent types may be demanded. 
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms 
his defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments 
upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or informa-
tion sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state 
and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of 
the averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a 
part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true 
and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends 
in good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he 
may make his denials as specific denials of designated averments or para-
graphs, or he may generally deny all the averments except such designated 
averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend 
to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the 
obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party 
shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, 
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, 
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, 
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of 
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affir-
mative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a coun-
terclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so 
requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation. 
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a respon-
sive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are 
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a plead-
ing to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as 
denied or avoided. 
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency. 
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No 
technical forms of pleading or motions are required. 
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense 
alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate 
counts or defenses. W7hen two or more statements are made in the alter-
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margin of not less than 1 inch. The impression must be on one side of the 
paper only and must be double spaced, except for matter customarily single 
spaced and indented. The number of the action shall be inserted on the first 
page of every pleading or other paper filed, and the matter appearing on all 
pleadings or other papers shall be clearly legible. 
The clerk of the court shall examine all pleadings and other papers filed and 
may require counsel to substitute for any pleadings or other papers not con-
forming to the foregoing requirements, original pleadings or other papers 
prepared in conformity with this subdivision. 
(e) Replacing lost pleadings or papers. If an original pleading or paper 
filed in any action or proceeding is lost, the court may, upon motion, with or 
without notice, authorize a copy thereof to be filed and used in lieu of the 
original. 
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1983.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially similar to Rule 10(a), F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
of a pleading to clarify or explain the same, an 
exhibit to a pleading cannot serve the purpose 
of supplying necessary material averments nor 
can the content of the exhibit be taken as part 
of the allegations of the pleading itself. Girard 
v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983). 
—Use as pleadings. Cited in State ex rel. Cannon v. Leary, 646 
While an exhibit may be considered as a part P.2d 727 (Utah 1982). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading A.L.R. — Propriety of attaching photo-
§§ 23 to 56, 69, 117. graphs to a pleading, 33 A.L.R.3d 322. 
C.J.S. — 71 C.J.S. Pleading S§ 5, 9,63 to 98, Key Numbers. — Pleading «*=> 4,13,15, 38V2 
371 to 375, 418. to 75, 307 to 312, 340. 
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; 
sanctions. 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attor-
ney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name 
who is duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah. The attorney's address 
also shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign 
his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when other-
wise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or 
accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer 
under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one 
witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature 
of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the 
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, informa-
tion, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and 
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 
ANALYSIS 
Exhibits. 
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modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not 
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is 
called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other 
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own 
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or 
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other 
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of 
the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 
(Amended, effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially similar to Rule 11, F.R.C.P. 
ANALYSIS 
Amendment of complaint. 
Violation. 
—Question of law. 
—Sanctions. 
Cited. 
Amendment of complaint. 
Amendment by an attorney of the facts 
stated in a complaint was sufficient to estab-
lish those facts as they would have been by a 
verified complaint before the changes made by 
this rule making verification unnecessary. 
Calder v. Third Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Salt 
Lake County, 2 Utah 2d 309, 273 P.2d 168 
(1954). 
Violation. 
—Question of law. 
Whether specific conduct amounts to a viola-
Brigham Young Law Review. — Curbing 
Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough Is 
Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 579. 
Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: 
We're Not There Yet, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 597. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 61A Am. Jur . 2d Pleading 
§§ 339 to 349. 
C.J.S. — 71 C.J.S. Pleading S§ 339 to 366. 
tion of this rule is a question of law. Taylor v. 
Estate of Taylor, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Ct. 
App. 1989). 
—Sanctions. 
This rule gives trial courts great leeway to 
tailor the sanction to fit the requirements of 
the particular case. Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 
102 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Imposition of $5,000 in attorney fees as a 
sanction for violating this rule was not an 
abuse of discretion, where the wrong document 
was attached to the complaint, causing defen-
dants to incur legal expense in researching the 
validity of an irrelevant document and prepar-
ing a motion to dismiss based thereon. Taylor 
v. Estate of Taylor, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Ct. 
App. 1989). 
Cited in Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
A.L.R. — Liability of attorney, acting for cli-
ent, for malicious prosecution, 46 A.L.R.4th 
249. 
Inherent power of federal district court to 
impose monetary sanctions on counsel in ab-
sence of contempt of court, 77 A.L.R. Fed. 789. 
Key Numbers. — Pleading <s=> 287 to 304. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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was an abuse of discretion Griffiths v Ham- J.P W. Enters , Inc. v Naef, 604 P.2d 486 
mon, 560 P 2d 1375 (Utah 1977). (Utah 1979), Katz v Pierce, 732 P 2d 92 (Utah 
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods Corp v. 1986). 
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P 2d 703 (1965); 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason- Opening default or default judgment claimed 
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for to have been obtained because of attorney's 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah Gra- mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
ham v Sawaya, 1981 B Y U L. Rev 937
 t n a l > o r f l l m g 0f necessarv papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am Jur 2d Judgments 1255 
*V.J?S. - 49 CJ S. Judgment, N 187 to 218. , V™lW? t 0 T ^ f ^ ^ ^ ^ d f 
A.L.R. - Necessity of taking proof as to ha- [aulfc J^te™** where notice is required only 
bihty against defaulting defendant, 8 A L.R 3d b? custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383 
1070 Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus- pretrial conference, 55 A L.R 3d 303 
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d Default judgments against the United States 
1272. under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam- Key Numbers. — Judgment <s=» 92 to 134. 
ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not m controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
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action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 





—Inconsistency with deposition. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Resting on pleadings. 
—Sufficiency. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony. 
—Superseding pleadings. 
— Unpleaded defenses. 
—Verified pleading. 
—Waiver of right to contest. 
—When unavailable. 
—Who may make. 
Affirmative defense. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Appeal. 








—Weight of testimony. 
Improper party plaintiff. 
Issue of fact. 
—Corporate existence. 
—Deeds. 
—Lease as security. 
Judicial attitude. 
Motion for new trial. 
Motion to dismiss. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Notice. 
—Provision not jurisdictional. 
—Waiver of defect. 
Procedural due process. 
Summary judgment. 
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material tacts as to which movant contends no genuine issue exists. The 
facts shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall refer with 
particularity to those portions of the record upon which movant relies. 
(e) The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgmen t shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement of 
material facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each 
fact in dispute shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall 
refer with particularity to those portions of the record upon which the 
opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered 
sentence or sentences of the movant 's facts that are disputed. Ail material 
facts set forth in the statement of the movant shall be deemed admitted 
for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted bv 
the statement of the opposing party. 
(f) Decision shall be rendered without a hearing unless requested bv 
the court, in which event the clerk shall set a date and time for such 
hearing. 
(g) In all cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the 
action or anv issues thereof on the merits with prejudice, the party 
resisting the motion mav request a hearing and such request shall be 
granted unless the motion is summarily denied. If no such request is 
m a d e within ten (10) davs of Notice to Submit for decision, a hearing on 
the motion shall be deemed waived. 
(h) Provided, however, that any district court and any circuit court bv 
order of the judge or judges of the court mav exclude that court from the 
operation of this Rule 2.8 in which case an alternative procedure shall be 
prescribed bv written administrative order or rule. 
Rule 2.9 Written Orders , Judgments , and Decrees 
(a) In all rulings bv a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining 
the ruling shall within fifteen (15) days, or within shorter t ime as the court 
mav direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment or decree in 
conformity with the ruling. 
(b) Copies of the proposed Findings, Judgment s , and/or Orders shall 
be served on opposing counsel before being presented to the court for 
signature unless the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections thereto 
shall be submitted to the court and counsel within (5) days after service. 
(c) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall be reduced to writing 
and presented to the court for signature within fifteen (15) days of the 
settlement and dismissal. 
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